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Rising longevity has led to population aging in developed countries, causing increasing
concerns about its economic impact. Specially, the trend of population aging increases health
expenditure in developed countries, and 70% to 80% of health expenditure is funded by public
sector. Therefore, this paper focuses on the health demand in an aging economy and examines
how the aging of the population and public health funding (PHF) a®ects agents' behavior. For
this purpose, we construct a simple growth model and examine the e®ect of aging and PHF on
saving and the growth rate. We show that an increase in life expectancy increases the growth
rate in the economy without PHF, but that it has an inverted U-shaped relation in the economy
with PHF. From the welfare standpoint, we show that it increases the intergenerational con°ict
between current and future generation and that PHF has the result of alleviating the con°ict.
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Global population aging is one of the most important demographic dynamics a®ecting individuals
and societies throughout the world. Population projections show that in more developed regions,
the population aged 65 or over is expected to nearly double (from 245 million in 2005 to 406 million
in 2050), whereas the number of persons aged 0-24 is likely to decline (from 372 million in 2005 to
131 million in 2050). People aged 65 or over in more developed countries represent 15.3% (2005)
and are estimated at 26.1% (2050) of the entire population; and people aged 0-24 represent 30.7%
(2005) and are also estimated at 25.8% (2050) (See, United Nations (2007)). Population aging has
many in°uences on the economy (for example, pay-as-you-go social security and the retirement age),
causing increasing concerns about its economic impacts. In the paper, we focus our attention on
the health expenditure in an aging economy and examine the e®ect of population aging on saving,
the growth rate, and public policy. Because health status tends to deteriorate with age, though,
the trend of population aging increases health expenditure and it counts for about 9% of GDP in
the OECD countries; and because approximately 70 to 80 % of health expenditure is funded by
public sectors except in Greece, Mexico, and the United States (See, OECD (2007)), the health
expenditure represents the important factor in an aging economy.
To examine these issues, the paper extends a two-period overlapping generations model by
introducing uncertain longevity (Pecchenino and Pollard (1997)) and household health production
(Grossman (1972) and Jacobson (2000)). In the model, we introduce the family as the producer
of health; this provides the essential insight that the family's joint resources are determinate for
health investments (expenditures) in family members.
Previous research has examined the potential for uncertain longevity to explain capital accu-
mulation or the economic growth. Earlier studies rely on Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), and
they show that an increased rate of life longevity increases capital stock. In some more recent
work, de la Croix and Licandro (1999) examine the economy where the e®ect of a reduction in
the mortality rate has consequences on a®ects the duration of education, and they show that the
growth rate becomes higher for a high mortality rate, but lower for a low mortality rate. Using
the uncertain lifetime horizon and endogenous retirement age model, Boucekkine, de la Croix, and
1Licandro (2002) derive the same result. ? also obtain the same results, not through own education
time but through expenditure on children's education time. Indeed, the results we present in the
paper show that greater longevity has di®erent e®ects on the economy depending on whether this is
with or without public funded health expenditure; and the paper also gains this result by a di®erent
channel.
The increasing health costs associated with an aging population have, in fact, received much
attention from other scholars. Using American data, Palumbo (1999) shows that uncertain out-of
pocket medical expense in old age is the motivation for much precautionary saving . Correspond-
ingly, using Taiwanese data, ? show that health insurance, which reduces uncertainty in future
medical expenses, can reduce households' precautionary saving. Our results in this paper con¯rm
their conclusions and show that the demand for health in old age provides another important motive
for saving decisions and economic growth.
My analysis builds primarily on previous research by Nakanishi and Nakayama (1993) and
Tabata (2005). Nakanishi and Nakayama (1993) give a microfoundation to the work in Grossman
(1972) by applying a cost minimization analysis to determine the demand for health. In his theo-
retical paper, Tabata (2005) constructs a growth model which incorporates health care in an aging
economy. The former analysis does not consider how the health demand a®ects individuals' saving
decision and economic growth; the latter analysis does not consider cost minimization in the role of
the determinants of aggregate health expenditure. When the family is the producer of health, they
have an incentive to minimize the cost, thus the cost minimization approach will achieve satisfac-
tory outcomes. My methodology, therefore, naturally allows an alternative growth model by using
the channel of the demand for health.
From a policy standpoint, it is important to understand the macroeconomic impact of the
demand for health of old agents. If agents save for old-age health expenditure for precautionary
reasons, then changes in government policy in°uence these agents' saving decisions. Therefore, in
this paper, we also construct a model of publicly funded health expenditure where the government
reimburses a part of the direct health care of agents; we then examine the macroeconomic e®ect of
publicly funded health expenditure on economic growth and welfare.
2The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in section 2. Section 3
analyzes the equilibrium of the economy without PHF. Section 4 analyzes the economy with PHF.
Section 5 examines the welfare of PHF. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an in¯nite-horizon economy composed of agents and perfectly competitive ¯rms. A new
generation, referred to as generation t, is born in each period t = 1;2;3;¢¢¢. Generation t ¸ 1 is
composed of a continuum of Nt > 0 units of agents who live maximum for two periods, young and
old age. The net rate of population growth is constant n > 0 : Nt = (1 + n)Nt¡1.
Firms
Firms are considered as perfectly competitive pro¯t maximizers that produce output using a Romer
(1986) type production function Yt = A(Kt)®(¹ ktLt)1¡®, where Yt is the aggregate output, A is
the parameter representing the technology level, Kt is the aggregate productive capital, Lt is the
aggregate labor, and ¹ kt is the average level of capital per worker in the economy. The production
function can be rewritten in an intensive form as yt = (kt)®(lt¹ kt)1¡®, where kt ´ Kt=Nt is a per
capita capital stock and lt ´ Kt=Nt is a per capita labor supply in period t. We assume that
capital depreciates completely in the process of production. Since ¯rms are price takers, they take
the wage, wt and real rental rate, 1 + rt as given and hire labor and capital up to the point where
their marginal products equal to their factor prices in period t. Noting kt = ¹ kt and lt = 1 in
equilibrium, the wage and the real rental rate are given as follows:
wt = (1 ¡ ®)Akt; 1 + rt = Rt = ®A: (1)
Agents
The model of individual behavior is based on that developed by Pecchenino and Pollard (1997).
The probability that an agent survives through the period of old age is p 2 (0;1). The probability
that an individual dies at the beginning of the period of old age, after having had a child is 1 ¡ p.
In the model, we introduce the family as the producer of health, thus the each agent's health
status in old age determined by the health expenditure of their own health expenditure (generation
t) and that of his or her children (generation t + 1). Using the Grossman (1972) and Jacobson
3(2000) model, we assume the household produced-health function as follows:
ht+1 = ±It
t+1 + (Ot
t+1)°(Qt+1)1¡° ± > 1; ° 2 (0;1); (2)
where It
t+1 is the indirect health expenditure; that is, exercise, food, and preventive medicine; Ot
t+1
is the direct health expenditure; that is, hospital, medicine, and nursing care; and Qt+1 = (1+n)q
t+1
t+1
is health expenditure of generation t + 1. The output from the above household-produced health
technology equalized with the health status of old generation.
In young age, each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, which supplies inelastically to ¯rm,
and obtains wage income. A fraction p of young agents are of type a, whose parents are survive.
Type d agents, whose parents die constitutes a fraction 1 ¡ p of young agents. Type d agents in
generation t consume a part of their income, ct
d;t and save the remainder, st
d;t for consumption
in old age. Type a agents di®er from type d agents in that they are a producer of household
health production and derive utility from contributing household health production, qt
t. They also
consume, ct
a;t and save the remainder, st
a;t. In what follows, we refer the type of young agents as




a;t) + (1 ¡ Á)(ct
d;t + st
d;t); (3)
where Á is an index indicating a agent's type and take Á = 1 or 0. Á, which is realized at the
beginning of date t immediately after agents of generation t are born, is distributed independently
and identically across agents and time with the probability distribution: Á = 1 with probability
p 2 (0;1), Á = 0 with probability 1 ¡ p.
In old age, type a agents, whose is survive is also constitute a fraction p 2 (0;1) of old agents.
If an agent dies, his or her annuitized wealth is transferred to the agents who live throughout old
age (see, Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985)). As the capital depreciate 100% in one period, agents
take Rt+1=p units of returns.
When we assume that old agents does not leave bequests to his or her children, old agents whose






t+1; i = a;d: (4)
4We assume that each agent in generation t has the expected utility function of the form:
Eui;t = lnci;t
t +Á¯ lnqt
t + EV (ct
t+1;ht+1;p); i = a;d; (5)
where ¯ 2 (0;1) shows the altruism towards their parents; EV (ct
t+1;ht+1;p) is the expected value
in old age. We assume that the expected value EV (ct
t+1;ht+1;p) takes the following log-linear form:
EV (ct
t+1;ht+1;p) = p[ln ¹ ¾ + ¾ lnct
t+1 + (1 ¡ ¾)lnht+1] + (1 + p)0; (6)
where ¾ 2 (0;1) is a weight attached to the utility from his or her consumption and health stasus;
and ¹ ¾ ´ 1=¾¾(1 ¡ ¾)1¡¾±1¡¾. Each agent of generation t maximizes his or her utility (5) subjects
(2), (3), (4), and (6). The timing is decided as follows:
1. Each agent maximizes his or her expected utility (5) subject to budget constraints (3) taking
wt and Rt+1 as given.
2. If an agent survives in their old age, he or she maximizes his or her old period's value (6)
subject to budget constraints (4).
3. An agent decides his or her household's health status by minimizing their cost It
t+1 + Ot
t+1
subject to home production function (2), taking the health expenditure of his or her children
Qt+1 as given.
3 Equilibrium
As a benchmark case, we ¯rst describe an economy in which there is no government. In Section
4, we introduce the public sector which funds the health expenditure of old generation. In order
to derive the equilibrium in benchmark case, we solve each agent's problem by following the three
timing which we showed in Section 2 by backward.
At ¯rst, let us derive the indirect and direct health expenditure in old age. An agent produces
his or her health status by minimizing the cost, that is, minimizing It
t+1 + Ot
t+1 subject to (2).






















1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
: (7)
5The second term in the right-hand side of (7) shows the value of aggregate health expenditures of
generation t + 1. An decrease (increase) in the health expenditures of generation t + 1 increases
(decrease) the demand for health.
Next, we examine the utility maximizing problem in old age. An agent who survives in his or her
old age, decides his or her old period's consumption and health status by maximizing the expected
value (6) subjects to (4) and (7). The ¯rst order condition for this problem yields the solution of










1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
i
; i = a;d; (8)








1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
i
; i = a;d: (9)
Since the ¯rst term in bracket on the right-hand side of (8) and (9) shows the return from saving
and the second term shows the value of aggregate health expenditure of generation t+1, the inside
of the bracket shows the old periods income of generation t. Therefore, in old age, the expected
income is allocated to the consumption and health status according to the weighted parameter.
Substituting (8) and (9) into (6), we have the value in his or her old age whose young period's










1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
i
; i = a;d: (10)
Finally, we derive the saving function, which is, maximizing (5) subjects to (3) and (10). The
¯rst order condition for this problem yields the solution of the young period's consumption, health
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6Since aggregate saving is the weighted sum of each agent1, we have:
st =
p
(1 + p + ¯)(1 + p)
h










The market clearing condition of capital is Kt+1 = stNt, which expresses the equality of the
total savings by young agents in generation t;stNt, to the stock of aggregate physical capital in
period t + 1;Kt+1. Dividing both sides by Nt leads the following:
(1 + n)kt+1 = st: (13)
In period 1, there are young agents in generation 1 and the initial old agents in generation 0. The
initial old agents of generation 0 is endowed with k1 units of capital. Each initial old agents rents
his or her capital to the insurance ¯rms and earns an income R1=pk1, which is then spent for
consumption and health expenditure. The measure of initial old agents is pN0 > 0. The utility of
an agent in generation 0 is p(lnc0
1 + lnh1).
De¯nition 1 An economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations and prices which satisfy the
following conditions at each date.
² Agents and ¯rms optimize, taking the wage rate and the rate of interest as given; that is, (1)
and (12) hold.
² Markets for goods, capital, and labor clear; that is, (13) and lt = 1 is hold.
² The health expenditure q
t+1
t+1 of generation t + 1, which is taken as given by each agent of
generation t ¸ 1 in his or her maximization problem is realized.






1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
=
p(1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)wt ¡ (1 + p + ¯)(1 + p)st
p(1 + p + ¯ + p2¯)
: (14)
To express the equilibrium in this economy in a compact manner, we note, ¯rst, that the third
condition in de¯nition together with (11) and (14) imply:
Qt+1 = (1 + n)
¯(1 + p)
1 + p + ¯ + p2¯
(wt+1 ¡ st+1): (15)
1Aggregate saving in period t is derived as st = pst
a;t + (1 ¡ p)st
d;t.
7Substituting (15) into (12), we have the equilibrium saving function as follows:
st =
p
(1 + p + ¯)(1 + p)
h
(1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)wt ¡



























1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
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+(1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)(1 ¡ ®)Akt = 0: (17)
































































The equilibrium path which satis¯es this condition is g1. Then the general solution is rewritten as
kt = Z1gt
1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.







then there exists a unique equilibrium such that kt = k1g
t¡1
1 , where g1 is given as (19) and g1 > 1
for each t ¸ 1.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 makes it clear that when the productivity parameter A is su±ciently large, the
8economy grows at the positive constant rate, g1. We can see that the output or GDP of this
economy grows at the same constant rate, g1. In addition, wage, wt, young-period consumption,
ct, young-period transfer, qt, and saving, st also grow at the same constant rate, g1. Because our
research interest is the aging economy in developed countries, the restriction of proposition 1 is
satisfactory.
The growth rate depends on the rate of life expectancy, p. The following proposition formalizes
the results of comparative statics result and its proof is given in Appendix 3.








an increase in the life expectancy increases the growth rate.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
An increase in life expectancy can be interpreted as the rate of time preference, as incorporated in
models such as those of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). Therefore, an increase in life expectancy
lowers each agent's rate of time preference and increases saving. In addition, the logic leading to
the e®ect of the productivity of health, ± is explained by the precautionary saving motive. When
health productivity increases, agents of generation t expect the health expenditure of generation
t + 1 to decrease (see, (14)); they thus have an incentive to prepare for future expenditure, which
results in an higher saving and growth rate.
4 Public Policy
In this section, we introduce a government that funds the health expenditure of old generation.
We assume that a government funds the health expenditure by reimbursing a part of direct health
expenditure. At each time, government levies payroll tax, ¿t on young agents (generation t), then
transfers these resources to old generation (generation t + 1) as a reimbursement of health expen-
diture. For analytical simplicity, we assume that government strategically decides reimbursement
rate, ² to the direct health spending for a given rate of life expectancy, p. Thus, we have the budget




9The left-hand side of (20) represents the aggregate revenue from income tax and the right-hand
side shows the aggregate spending of public funded health. The tax rate in period t is decided to
satisfy the budget constraint (20), an increase in life expectancy, p and the reimbursement rate, ²
increases the tax rate. Taking Rt+1;wt;p;¿t and ² as given, each agent maximizes his or her utility
(5) subjects to (2) and following constraints:
(1 ¡ ¿t)wt = Á(ca;t
t +qt
t + sa;t







t+1 + (1 ¡ ²)Ot
t+1; i = a;d: (22)
Solving this problem using the similar method to that used in Section 3, we respectively have




















Public health funding (PHF) increases the demand of direct health expenditure, Ot
t+1. Since the
health production is the joint production function of indirect health expenditure and direct health
expenditure, an increase the demand for direct health expenditure leads to decrease the demand
for indirect health expenditure. The aggregate demand for health is derived as follows:
It















By comparing (7) and (24), we found that PHF also decreases the aggregate demand for health of
old agents. Solving the utility maximization problem as a same manner in section 3, we have the
aggregate saving in period t as follows:2
st =
p
















In equilibrium, we guess the aggregate health expenditure of generation t + 1 as follows:
Qt+1 = (1 + n)
¯(1 + p)
1 + p + ¯ + p2¯
h
(1 ¡ ¿t+1)wt+1 ¡ st+1
i
: (26)
Comparing (14) and (26), we found that the tax burden of PHF decreases the health expenditure
of generation t + 1.
2See, appendix 4 in details.
10Using (25) and (26), we have the equilibrium saving function as follows:
st =
p
(1 + p + ¯)(1 + p)
n
(1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)(1 ¡ ¿t)wt
¡








1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
[(1 ¡ ¿t+1)wt+1 ¡ st+1]
o
: (27)
By comparing the saving function with and without PHF (See, (16) and (27)), we found that PHF
has three e®ects on saving. The ¯rst e®ect is shown in the ¯rst term in the bracket on the right-
hand side of (27). Income tax decreases disposable income; this e®ect has a negative impact on
saving. We call this e®ect a direct tax e®ect. The second e®ect is a health cost e®ect. Since PHF
reduces the demand for health, the incentive to prepare the expense of health in old age decreases.
Therefore, a health cost e®ect also has a negative impact on saving. The last e®ect is a transfer
e®ect. As mentioned in the ¯rst e®ect, as PHF decreases disposable income, the health expenditure
of generation t + 1 decreases. A decrease in the health expenditure of generation t creates the
incentive to prepare to spend on health in his or her old period. Thus, this e®ect has a positive
impact on saving. The second and third e®ects are shown in the second term in the bracket on the
right-hand side of (27).
Since we have not considered the debt, the budget of government must be balanced each time;













1¡° , and B ´ 1+¯. Since @¿t=@p > 0,3 an increase in life expectancy
increases tax rate.
Substituting (28) and (13) into (27), we can rewrite the saving function as follows:
st =
p
(1 + p)(1 + p + ¯ + pX)
h
(1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)wt ¡













3sign(@¿t=@p)= sign [(1 + 2p)(1 + ¯) + 2p2(1 ¡ ¯)] > 0.
11We then substitute equilibrium conditions (1) into (29), to obtain:




























(1 + p + ¯ + pX)
i
kt+1
+(1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)(1 ¡ ®)Akt = 0 (30)
The general solution of this second-order linear di®erence equation is given by:
~ kt = ~ Z1~ gt
1 + ~ Z2~ gt
2;
~ g1 = A
³ ~ ¢ ¡
p
~ £
(1 + n)2~ ­
´
; (31)
~ g2 = A
³ ~ ¢ +
p
~ £
(1 + n)2~ ­
´
;
















































° > 0. Lager
root ~ g2 does not satisfy the resource constraint, the general equation is rewritten as ~ kt = ~ Z1~ gt
1.4




~ £)(1 + n)
2p(1 ¡ ®)
;
then, there exists a unique equilibrium such that ~ kt = ~ k1~ g
t¡1
1 , where ~ g1 is given as (31) and ~ g1 > 1
for each t ¸ 1.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Suppose that the productive parameter A is su±ciently large, the economy grows at a constant rate
of gt+1 ´ kt+1=kt = ~ g1 at each date t ¸ 1. It is easy to see that the output or GDP of this economy
grow at the same constant rate ~ g1. The following two propositions respectively shows the impact
of PHF and life expectancy on growth rate and proof are given in Appendix 6 and Appendix 7.
Proposition 4 For a given level of life expectancy, PFH decreases the growth rate.
Proof. See, Appendix 6.
Since the rate of reimbursement, ² determines the size of PHF, the impact of the rate of reimburse-
4Let us de¯ne the characteristic equation of (30) as F(~ g). Deriving the condition of resource constraint as the
same way in Lemma 1, we have F[(1 ¡ ®)A=(1 + n)] = ¡(1 ¡ ®)A[2 + ¯ + (2 + ¯)(1 + n)X] < 0. Thus, we have:
F(~ g1) < F[(1 ¡ ®)A=(1 + n)] < F(~ b2).
12ment on the growth rate represents the PHF e®ect on the growth rate. Although the tax burden
reduces the health expenditure of generation t + 1 and leads to a positive incentive on saving, a
negative health cost e®ect and tax burden e®ect on saving dominate the positive e®ect result in
reducing the saving and growth rate.
Proposition 5 An increase in life expectancy increases (decreases) the growth rate when the rate
of life expectancy is small (large).
Proof. See, Appendix 7.
When the rate of life expectancy is small, the public sector does not ¯nd it necessary to fund a large
amount of health funding. Thus, the negative tax burden and health cost e®ect on saving becomes
small; and these e®ects are dominated by the positive transfer e®ect. On the other hand, when the
life expectancy is large, the public sector has to fund the large amount of health funding. Thus,
the negative tax burden and health cost e®ect on saving becomes large, and these e®ects dominate
the positive transfer e®ect.
5 The E®ect of Public Funded Health Spending
In this section examines whether public funded health expenditure accelerates the welfare level or
not. Let superscripts \n" and \p" respectively denote \the economy with no public funded health
spending or the economy with e = 0", \the economy with public funded health spending or the
economy with ² 2 (0;1)". The welfare of each member is measured by his or her expected utility
which given by (5). To examine the welfare, let us de¯ne the Benthamite social welfare function;
that is, the welfare level of period t is measured by the sum of the utility of generation t ¡ 1 and
generation t who live in period t. This sum is formulated as follows:
Wt = p(lnct
a;t + ¯ lnqt
t) + (1 ¡ p)lnct
d;t + EV (c
t¡1
t ;ht;p): (32)
13Substituting the equilibrium values, we respectively have the welfare level of period t as follows:5




p + p2¯ + B
´
+ln
n(p + p2¯ + B)(1 ¡ ®)A
gn + p(1 + p)D[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)gn]
oo
;
Wt;p = ¤ + (1 + p + ¯)
n
(t ¡ 1)ln(gp) + ln
³ 1
p + p2¯ + B + p(1 + p)X
´
+ln
n(p + p2¯ + B)(1 ¡ ®)A





[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)gp]
oo
;
where ¤ ´ pln( 1
1+p+¯) + p¯ ln(
¯
1+p+¯) + (1 ¡ p)ln( 1
1+p) + p2 ln( ®A
1+p+¯) + p(1 ¡ p)ln( ®A
1+p) + (1 +








To determine how PHF accelerates the welfare level or not, we subtract Wt;n from Wt;p:

















n(1 + p + ¯ + p2¯)(1 ¡ ®)A





[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)gn]
o
¡ln
n(p + p2¯ + B)(1 ¡ ®)A
gn + p(1 + p)D[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)gn]
oio
(33)
The ¯rst term of the brackets in the right-hand side of (33) represents the growth e®ect of PHF.
PHF decreases the growth rate, it has negative impact on the welfare. The second brackets in the
right-hand side of (33) represents the tax burden e®ect of PHF. PHF increases the tax burden,
it also has the negative impact on the welfare. The third brackets in the right-hand side of (33)
represents the transfer e®ect of PHF. PHF increases the transfers, it has positive impact on the
welfare.
Lemma 2 An increase in life expectancy increases the positive and negative value of each e®ect
Proof. See Appendix 9.
(1) Since the economy without PHF has a higher growth rate than that with PHF, and an increase
in life expectancy increases the growth rate of the economy without PHF, the result of growth
e®ect is obvious. (2) An increase in life expectancy increases the tax burden; thus the negative
tax burden e®ect on PHF increases with an increase in life expectancy. (3) An increase in the
5See Appendix 8 for derivation.
14growth rate increases the opportunity cost of the health expenditure of the young generation, thus
an increase in the growth rate decreases the health expenditure of the young generation. Because
the growth rate on the economy without PHF is higher than that of the economy without PHF,
the positive impact of PHF on welfare increases.
Proposition 6
1. Suppose that






PHF accelerates (deteriorate) the welfare of current generation when the rate of life expectancy
is large (small).
2. PHF deteriorates the welfare level of future generation.
3. An increase in life expectancy yields the intergenerational con°ict between current and future
generation at the economy without PHF. However, PHF alleviates the con°ict.
Proof. See, Appendix 10.
Since the growth rate of the economy without PHF is higher than that of the economy with PHF,
the speed of a decrease in transfer e®ect is larger than that of the economy with PHF. Therefore,
when the growth rate of the economy with PHF is su±ciently large, an increase in life expectancy
accelerates the welfare level of PHF. The assumption of the condition also shows these results.
The growth rate tends to increase monotonically and takes maximum values as t ! 1, thus for
the future generation, the impact of the growth e®ect dominates the other e®ects. Since PHF has
a negative impact on the growth e®ect, it deteriorates the welfare level of the future generation.
In an economy without PHF, an increase in life expectancy increases the growth rate, and the
welfare level of current and future generation tends to large when the life expectancy is large. On
the other hand, in an economy with PHF, there is an inverted-U shaped relation between growth
rate and life expectancy; thus an increase in life expectancy decreases growth rate and results in
the alleviation of intergenerational con°ict.
156 Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the increased amount of health expenditure in an aging economy and
examine the e®ect of life expectancy on saving and the growth rate by using the health demand in
old age. In the ¯rst part of this paper, we construct the benchmark model of the demand for health
and then introduce the government, who is the authority of public funded health spending (PHF).
By analyzing the model, we show that an increase in the life expectancy increases the growth
rate in an economy without PHF. On the other hand, in an economy with PHF, an increase in life
expectancy increases (decreases) the growth rate when the rate of life expectancy is small (high).
We also show that the PFH accelerates the welfare level of current generations when the rate of life
expectancy is large, but it deteriorates the welfare level of future generations, and as the generation
goes on, it results in a lower level of welfare. Although the intergenerational con°ict between current
and future generations get bigger with an increase in life expectancy, we show that PHF has a role
to play in alleviating the intergenerational con°ict.
Appendix
Appendix 1
We have the characteristic equation of (17) as follows:














1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
+
(1 + p + ¯)(1 + p)
p
i
g + (1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)(1 ¡ ®)A = 0:
De¯ne the left-hand side of the characteristic equation as follows:














1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
+
(1 + p + ¯)(1 + p)
p
i
g + (1 + p + ¯ ¡ p¯)(1 ¡ ®)A:
The budget constraint (3) is rewritten as st · wt. Substituting equilibrium values (1) and (13) into









16Substituting (34) into (34), we have f[(1 ¡ ®)A=(1 + n)] = ¡(1 ¡ ®)A(1 + p + ¯ + p2¯)=p < 0 and
g1 < (1 ¡ ®)A=(1 + n) < g2. As any equilibrium path must satisfy the resource constraint (3),




The necessary and su±cient condition that the growth rate is positive is b1 > 1. From (19), the







The equilibrium condition must satisfy its initial condition, k1 = Z1g1. Arranging this, we have
Z1 = k1=g1, thus the equilibrium path is given by kt = k1(g1)t¡1 for each t ¸ 1.
Appendix 3
(i) As the growth rate in this economy is given by g ´ kt+1=kt = b1(constant), the total di®erentiate
























p2 ]g + (1 ¡ ®)A(1 ¡ ¯)
(2(1 + n)­b ¡ ¢)
:
Substituting (19) into the denominator follows ¡(1 + n)
p





When p ! 0; the second term of
@f(g)
@p tends to +1, then
@f(g)
@p = 0 has two negative roots. It
leads to
@f(g)
@p > 0 for all g > 0: When p ! 1; the second term of
@f(g)
@p tends to positive suppose
that ± > °(1¡®
®
1¡°
° )1¡°, to obtain
@f(g)
@p > 0 for all g > 0:
Appendix 4
The old age consumption and health level is determined by maximizing (6) subjects to (22) and
(24). The ¯rst order condition derive the following consumption and health demand in his or her












1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
i
; i = a;d










1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
i
; i = a;d:
The utility maximization problem in his or her young period is solved in the same manner as section
3. The ¯rst order condition for this problem yields the solution for the young period's consumption,
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The necessary and su±cient condition that the growth rate is positive is ~ g1 > 1. From (31), the




~ £)(1 + n)
2p(1 ¡ ®)
:
The equilibrium condition must satisfy its initial condition, ~ k1 = ~ Z1~ g1. Arranging this, we have
~ Z1 = ~ k1=~ g1, thus the equilibrium path is given by ~ kt = ~ k1(~ g1)t¡1 for each t ¸ 1.
Appendix 6
Since the economy without PHF is the economy with ² = 0 and that of with PHF is the economy
with ² 2 (0;1), an e®ect of ² on the economic growth shows the e®ect of PHF on the economic
growth. The growth rate in this economy is given by g ´ kt+1=kt = ~ g1 (constant), total di®erentiate










(1 + n)[2(1 + n)~ ­g ¡ ~ ¢]









1¡° 1 ¡ °
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g2 ¡ (1 + n)
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Substituting (31) into the denominator follows ¡(1+n)
p
























0 and 1 < ~ g1 <
(1¡®)A











































1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
¯ +
¡(1 + p)(1 ¡ p) ¡ ¯
p2 + (1 + N)¯X]g
+(1 ¡ ®)A(1 ¡ ¯)
o
:
When p ! 0; the second term of
@F(b)
@p tends to +1, then
@F(b)
@p has two negative roots. It leads
to
@F(b)
@p > 0 for all g > 0: To examine the case of p ! 1, let us de¯ne limp!1
@F(g)























1+n ) = (1 ¡ ®)A[1 ¡ ¯(1 + n)X], thus we have ª(
(1¡®)A







Now let us de¯ne the ¹ g1 and ¹ g2 as the solution of ª(
(1¡®)A













































































Therefore there exists p? 2 (0;1) such that
@F(g)
@p = 0, and have
@F(g)
@p > 0 for p 2 (0;p?] and
@F(g)
@p < 0 for p 2 [p?;1):
Appendix 8





1 + p + ¯
[(1 ¡ ®)Akt +
p(1 + p)D
®A(p + p2¯ + B)





1 + p + ¯
[(1 ¡ ®)Akt +
p(1 + p)D






1¡° 1 ¡ °
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[(1 ¡ ®)Akt +
p(1 + p)D
®A(p + p2¯ + B)













1¡° 1 ¡ °
°








1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
g)
= p(1 ¡ p)lnf
®A
1 + p
[(1 ¡ ®)Akt +
p(1 + p)D
®A(p + p2¯ + B)
[(1 ¡ ®)Akt+1 ¡ (1 + n)kt+2]]g;
19then substituting these values into (32) we have the welfare of generation t at the economy without
PHF.6





1 + p + ¯
[(1 ¡ ®)Akt +
(1 + n)Xkt+1
p + p2¯ + B
+
p(1 + p)D











1 + p + ¯
[(1 ¡ ®)Akt +
(1 + n)Xkt+1
p + p2¯ + B
+
p(1 + p)D












[(1 ¡ ®)Akt + +
(1 + n)Xkt+1
p + p2¯ + B
+
p(1 + p)D
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1¡° 1 ¡ °
°
g)
= p(1 ¡ p)lnf
®A
1 + p
[(1 ¡ ®)Akt + +
(1 + n)Xkt+1
p + p2¯ + B
+
p(1 + p)D






1¡° [(1 ¡ ®)Akt+1 ¡ (1 + n)kt+2]]g;




Let us de¯ne ¨(p) ´ ln(
g
n






gpgn : Nothing that
@g
p
@p < 0 for p 2 [p?;1),
¨0(p) > 0 for p 2 [p?;1). Since limp!0 ¨0(p) = 0 and ¨0(p) > 0 for all p 2 (0;1), an increase in life
expectancy increases the negative growth e®ect of PHF.
(2) Tax e®ect:
Let us de¯ne £(p) ´ ln(
p+p
2¯+B+p(1+p)X








[(p+p2¯+B)(p+p2¯+B+p(1+p)X)]2 < 0; and
limp!0 £0(p) = 1
1+¯ > 0: Therefore an increase in the life expectancy increases the negative tax
burden e®ect of PHF.
(3) Transfer e®ect:
Let us de¯ne N ´
(p+p
2¯+B)(1¡®)A




(1 + n)p(1 + p)X + p(1 + p)D( 1
1¡²)
°
1¡° [(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)gp]: The di®erence of the transfer e®ect
with PHF and without PHF is shown as lnP ¡ lnN. Since P = N when ² = 0 and an increase in
² increases the value of P, we have ln( P
N) > 0.
To examine the e®ect of life expectancy on transfer e®ect, let us compare the e®ect of life
expectancy on P and N as follows: @P
@p ¡ @N




gngp ) + (p + p2¯ + B)(1 ¡
































@p > 0 for p 2 [p¤;1), @P
@p ¡ @N
@p > 0
for the regime. In addition, limp!0(@P
@p ¡ @N
@p ) = 0, we have the result that life expectancy increases
the positive transfer e®ect of PHF.
Appendix 10
(1) Let us de¯ne ©(p) ´ ln( P
N); then ©0(p) = 1
NP (@P
@p N ¡ @N
@p P) > 0. Since limp!0 ¨0(p) = 0,
limp!0 £0(p) = 1
1+¯ > 0 , and limp!0 ©0(p) = 0 (see, lemma 2), ¨(0) + £(0) > ©(0): Therefore, if
¨(1) + £(1) < ©(1), there exists unique p¤¤ 2 (0;1) such that ¨(p) + £(p) = ©(p):












gn +2D[(1¡®)A¡(1+n)gn] g >











p[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)g
p] ¡ g
n[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)g
n]g
(1 + ¯)(1 ¡ ®)A + Dgn[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)gn]
:
Arranging this, we have
D(X + (1 + ¯))g
n[(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)g






p ¡ X][(1 ¡ ®)A ¡ (1 + n)g
p]:
Therefore, if it holds the relation, we have the result of ¨(1) + £(1) < ©(1):
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